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ABSTRACT
We introduce a semantic identification attack, in which an
adversary uses semantic signals about the pages visited in
one browsing session to identify other browsing sessions launched
by the same user. Current user fingerprinting methods fail
when a single machine is used by multiple users (e.g., in cy-
bercafes or spaces with public computers) as these methods
fingerprint devices, not individuals. We demonstrate how
an adversary can employ a SIA to successfully fingerprint
users on public or shared machines and identify them across
browsing sessions. We additionally describe and evaluate
possible countermeasures to prevent identification.
1. INTRODUCTION
Online privacy is becoming an increasingly important issue
for users, policy makers, and academic researchers. In re-
cent years there has been significant work highlighting the
fragility of user privacy by exposing threats ranging from the
de-anonymization of public data sets to third party tracking
in online browsing. A particular area of focus is user finger-
printing in web browsing. Prior work has demonstrated that
by analyzing device and network information (screen reso-
lution, extensions installed, IP address, etc), an adversary
can uniquely identify an individual and track their browsing
across multiple sessions.
However, because these methods rely on information about
the device, they effectively fingerprint devices and not users.
If two individuals use the same device (leaving the configu-
ration and settings unchanged), current fingerprinting tech-
niques would fail to distinguish between the two individuals.
An adversary may incorrectly assume that there is one user
whose activity is the composite of the two individual’s ac-
tions.
Though web browsing devices are considered ubiquitous to-
day, it is still common for a single device to be shared by
multiple individuals. Many homes have a single computer
that is shared by a family. Spaces such as libraries or lounges
often have publicly available devices. In developing coun-
tries, internet cafes are common for individuals who can’t
afford personal computers.
The primary contribution of our work is to show that users
can still be identified in these cases. Our intuition is that a
user’s behavior can provide the basis for that user’s finger-
print. We introduce methods capable of fingerprinting users
by their behavior in web browsing. Specifically, we present
a Semantic Identification Attack, in which an adversary uses
the semantic signals from a user’s browsing session (i.e. the
content of the pages they visited) to identify other sessions
launched by the same user. A user is unlikely to visit the
same urls in every session. However, the urls in a given user’s
browsing sessions are unlikely to be drawn completely at ran-
dom from all the urls on the web. If a user’s web browsing is
characterized by a set of tasks (checking certain news topics,
reading specific blogs, etc), their browsing sessions will con-
sistently contain visits to pages/websites relevant to these
tasks. The distribution of these visits can be viewed as a
user specific session fingerprint. Though a user’s browsing
sessions are likely to deviate and contain other behavior as
well, the presence of these pages fingerprints the user to the
session.
User fingerprinting can be both beneficial and harmful. Law
enforcement could use fingerprinting to track and identify in-
dividuals engaging in harmful or malicious activities. Alter-
natively, authoritarian governments could use fingerprinting
to track dissenting individuals and suppress citizens.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We first review past
work in user fingerprinting. We then provide an example and
describe the optimum threat model for a semantic identifi-
cation attack. We describe various methods for launching
the attack and validate each of them on several different
browsing datasets. Finally, we discuss and evaluate several
countermeasures a user could employ to protect their pri-
vacy.
2. RELATEDWORK
There has been significant work on fingerprinting users on
the basis of their browser[23][16]. [9] and [24] describe how
users can be uniquely identified by analyzing system fonts,
screen resolution, information stored in HTTP headers (ie,
HTTP User Agent strings) and coarse IP prefix information
(users can test their fingerprints at [1] or [2]). Additionally,
[17] showed that it is possible to fingerprint users by lever-
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aging the subtle differences in the ways different browsers
render the same text. These differences provide consistent,
unique fingerprints that can be used to track users.
However, there has been little work on identifying user web
browsing without using browser metadata or network infor-
mation as features. Our paper shows however, that even if
a user were to take these precautions, an adversary could
still identify them on the basis of the content of their brows-
ing. Browsing history is a strong predictor for learning user
attributes, suggesting that semantic signals from browsing
sessions could convey significant discriminating information
[10]. Jones et al [13] show that it is possible to infer per-
sonal information (gender, age, location, etc) from query
logs and link a particular user to a query stream when pro-
vided with some background information on that user. [14]
demonstrates that even a countermeasure like token-based
hashing of queries fails to prevent an adversary from identi-
fying users. [11] proposes the ZEALOUS algorithm, which
is capable of achieving strong privacy guarantees on query
logs. [20] focuses on determining when a single individual
is masquerading behind multiple aliases on a web forum us-
ing the content present in forum posts. It is similar to our
work in that it aims to use semantic information to uniquely
identify individuals. However, [20] is applied to a forum (as
opposed to web browsing) and leverages significantly richer
data.
Another closely related field of study is differential privacy[19].
Though differential privacy is primarily concerned with the
privacy guarantees of statistical databases and their individ-
ual entries, some of the core concepts and ideas are appli-
cable in our case. [8] describes some key findings. [7] also
present techniques for preserving privacy in data mining ap-
plications. The 2006 AOL scandal demonstrated that there
are techniques available to identify users from anonymized
web search data [12]. Narayanan and Shmatikov presented
a further class of de-anonymization techniques by using the
IMDB dataset to identify individual users in the Netflix
Prize Dataset [18].
3. THREAT MODEL
We now describe the threat model for a semantic identifi-
cation attack. Specifically, we present the optimal case for
such an attack, discuss the damage an adversary is capable
of, and describe how traditional attacks (discussed previ-
ously) may fail.
We focus on a single computer used for web browsing at an
internet cafe. Different individuals would use this machine
to launch browsing sessions, during which they visit various
web pages of interest to them. Individuals repeatedly use
this machine, so that over a period of time (perhaps sev-
eral weeks), a majority of individuals would have launched
multiple browsing sessions on this machine. An adversary
launching a semantic identification attack on this computer
would seek to identify which browsing sessions belonged to
the same user. Ideally, the adversary would be able to group
all browsing sessions by their users. We say that an adver-
sary is able to ”successfully fingerprint” a user if they are
able to identify the exact set of sessions belonging to that
user.
This threat model makes the following assumptions on the
adversary’s capabilities:
1. An adversary could be any attacker that has access to
at least some fraction of the user’s session logs. At
the very least, the adversary needs to know some in-
formation about the content of at least some of the
pages visited by the user in a session. The adversary
also needs to be able to distinguish between different
sessions (i.e., know when one session ends and another
begins). If the adversary knows the URLs visited by a
user, we assume the adversary can crawl them later.
2. The adversary cannot physically ”see” the user. The
problem of identification could be solved trivially if
the adversary were to sit in the cafe and observe every
user who used the device. We can safely assume that
the adversary is operating remotely and has no way
of physically seeing which users are browsing on the
device at any given time.
Given the flexibility of the requirements, the scope of poten-
tial adversaries is quite large. An analytics or advertising
network could launch this attack using third party cookies.
These cookies would allow the adversary to track the vari-
ous the web pages that a user visits within a single session.
Equivalently, a website like the New York Times - where
multiple users may use the same account to access content
- may use this attack to determine which browsing sessions
belong to the same user (despite all sessions being in the
same ”account name”).
Despite the perceived ubiquitousness of personal web brows-
ing devices (phones, laptops, etc), the threat model de-
scribed above is widely applicable. Internet cafes are in-
credibly popular in developing countries, where individuals
cannot afford to purchase a personal computer but still need
to perform various web tasks. For example, a 2013 South
African study revealed that 9.6% of South Africans who go
online do so through internet cafes [6]. As of July 2012,
25.4% of internet users in China frequently visited an inter-
net cafe (138.3 million users) [21].
The threat model described above could be generalized for
any shared device. This could include homes/small busi-
nesses that own one computer, or any publicly available
computer (like those found in lounges, libraries, airports,
etc).
Because most fingerprinting techniques rely on device spe-
cific metadata (browser configurations, network information)
they instead fingerprint devices and assume that every de-
vice has a single user. By not using device metadata and
instead relying on the content of web pages visited by users,
a semantic identification attack does not require the one-
device-one-user assumption. In this paper, we show how
such an SIA can successfully fingerprint users within the
threat model presented above and evaluate various approaches
on browsing data.
4. CONTENT FINGERPRINT
As mentioned above, a semantic identification attack at-
tempts to identify and distinguish users based on their be-
havior (the pages and websites they visit). In order to do
so, the attack aims to construct a fingerprint for each user
from their behavior in a single session. We refer to this fin-
gerprint as a user’s content fingerprint. We now describe the
motivation for this behavior based fingerprint.
4.1 Intuition
The goal of a SIA is to distinguish between multiple individ-
uals browsing the web on the same machine. Web browsing
is a highly personal activity and the pages a person visits
are a function of their interests, tasks, and habits. Observe
that every page can be described as a set of semantic sig-
nals, or features which broadly describe the content of the
page (ie the words on the page, entities mentioned, etc). By
taking all pages visited by a user, we can observe a distribu-
tion over all semantic signals that describes the user’s inter-
ests/tasks/habits. We refer to this distribution as a user’s
profile. Similarly, we can observe the distribution of seman-
tic signals over a single session of browsing. This distribution
is the user’s content fingerprint. A semantic identification
attack makes two primary assumptions:
1. Uniqueness: We assume that an individual’s profile
is unique. Since a SIA attempts to distinguish the in-
dividuals using a single machine to browse the web, the
set of users being compared is relatively small. This
assumption of local uniqueness is thus relatively safe.
2. Consistency: We assume that the content finger-
prints for two distinct sessions from the same user are
approximately equal. Since a user’s profile is a distri-
bution across all pages visited, the content fingerprint
is effectively a sample from this distribution (corre-
sponding to a single session). We can thus safely as-
sume that a user’s sessions are representative of their
profile.
Exceptions to these assumptions are discussed in further
depth later in this paper. Because a user’s profile is unique
and their browsing consistent across sessions, it should be
possible to fingerprint users through their content finger-
prints. More precisely, given two sessions, an adversary
should be able to compare the content fingerprints of each in
order to determine if they were launched by the same user.
If the content fingerprints are sufficiently similar, then an
adversary can safely decide that they share the same user.
If they are different, then an adversary can decide otherwise.
Thus, the goal of the adversary is to identify semantic sig-
nals from each page and extract content fingerprints from
each session such that the two assumptions above are satis-
fied. If the content fingerprints extracted from each session
aren’t granular enough, then content fingerprints will not
be unique. However, if content fingerprints are too granu-
lar, then it will be impossible to resolve that two sessions
have the same user, as their content fingerprints will look
too different.
In the following sections we formalize this intuition and ex-
plain this process in further detail using an example.
4.2 Formalization
Every page has an associated set of features (semantic sig-
nals). A user profile b is the distribution over these features
for all pages visited by a user u. Given a session consisting
of a set of s pages visited by u, we expect the distribution
over these features - the content fingerprint, given by f - for
the session to resemble b as s grows.
Thus, given a session s1 from a user u with a browsing profile
b, we can say that a session s2 belongs to u if
1. b is unique amongst all users, and
2. Both s1 and s2 have sufficiently similar distribution
over features. Ie, f1 (corresponding to s1) is sufficiently
similar to f2 (corresponding to s2)
If either of these conditions is false, then we cannot defini-
tively say that s1 and s2 belong to the same user.
When extending this to multiple users, we do as follows.
Take a set of sessions S = {s1, ..., sm} where each s ∈ S
was launched by a user from the set U = {u1, ..., un} but
the mapping from si to uj is unknown (ie, we do not know
which sessions were launched by which users). An adversary
launching a SIA would attempt to partition S into n subsets
such that all the sessions in subset i were launched by ui.
For each session, the adversary would attempt to construct
a content fingerprint (giving f1, ...fm). Since content finger-
prints are unique to users, the adversary would compare all
fi. If two sessions had similar fi, then the adversary would
know that both originated from the same user.
4.3 Semantic Signals
The content fingerprint of a user is a representation of that
user’s interests, habits, and tasks. In order to capture these,
the adversary needs some signals regarding the topics/content
of the user’s browsing. We refer to these as the semantic sig-
nals from the session. Semantic signals capture the content
of each page at some level of granularity. They allow the ad-
versary to extract the user based content fingerprint. Some
examples of semantic signals include:
• The words on the page visited
• Categorical classifications for the page visited (e.g.,
”news”, ”social media”, ”cooking”)
• The title of the page
• Links on a page
• URL of a page
• Page tags (derived from social bookmarking sites, knowl-
edge bases, etc)
The success of a semantic identification attack is highly de-
pendent on the granularity of the semantic signals. Rich
signals - such as a listing of every word on every page visit
will allow the adversary to extract a more powerful content
fingerprint. Weak signals - such as a simple classification of
each web page (ie ”news”), is rather poor and will lead to
fewer unique content fingerprints.
The semantic signals available to an adversary depend on
the adversary’s capabilities and the position from which they
launch the attack. In this work, we demonstrate that even a
weak adversary with poor signals can still uniquely identify
some users.
4.4 Practical Considerations
We now discuss several practical considerations of SIA at-
tack strategies.
4.4.1 Fingerprint Uniqueness
An SIA assumes that an adversary will be able to extract
a content fingerprint from a session that is unique enough
to identify the user. This is not always possible. If a user’s
behavior in a session doesn’t sufficiently reflect their user
profile, then it will be difficult for the adversary to extract
a representative content fingerprint. This could occur when
1. The session is not long enough, and contains relatively
few page visits.
2. The session represents a one time task like planning a
vacation or reacting to an emergency
3. The user’s behavior is not unique.
The first case is analogous to a user’s session consisting
of a relatively small sample from their profile. Unless the
sampled sessions contains semantic signals that are highly
unique to the user, it’ll be much harder to determine the
owner of the session.
In the second case, the user’s behavior deviates significantly
from their profile. Most users do not routinely plan vaca-
tions or deal with emergencies - these are one time tasks.
As a result, semantic signals from these tasks are unlikely
to be represented in the user’s profile. Thus, resolving these
sessions to the user will be a difficult.
In the third case, the user’s profile is not sufficiently unique.
For example, it’s probable that there are many individuals
who use the web only for ”general” or ”common” tasks. For
example, their web browsing may be restricted to checking
the weather and reading the local news. These tasks aren’t
very personal or unique. It will be nearly impossible for an
adversary to extract discriminating and consistent content
fingerprints for each of these individuals.
It is important to recognize the limits of this attack. While
it is probable that any two randomly selected individuals
will differ significantly in their browsing behavior, identi-
fying users grows in difficulty as the population of users in-
creases. Intuitively, an SIA attempts to identify distinguish-
ing characteristics between users. Since larger populations
of individuals are more likely to converge on some ”median”
behavior, identifying these characteristics becomes relatively
harder with more users. Though an SIA can be an effective
attack (as we demonstrate), it is successful only on a pro-
portion of the users. There will be certain users - namely
those who lack any unique behaviors - for whom the attack
will likely fail.
4.4.2 Fingerprint Similarity
Even if two sessions were launched by the same user, it’s un-
likely that the extracted content fingerprints will be exactly
the same. Thus, determining whether two sessions share the
same user should be based on the fingerprint similarity of
the two sessions. If the fingerprints are similar, then we have
more confidence that they originated from the same user.
4.5 Example
We now describe an example to illustrate the principles de-
scribed above.
Imagine a farmer living in rural India. Several times a week
he visits an internet cafe and spends an hour browsing the
web. As a farmer, he is interested in the local weather pat-
terns and the markets for his produce (focusing specifically
on certain types of goods). He may also visit various reli-
gious blogs to find out about upcoming festivals. All of these
topics act as markers for this user. His content fingerprint
would likely indicate a skew towards pages covering these
topics. He is characterized by these interests - the locality
of his news, his professional interests, and his religious in-
terest. Individually, none of these interests are unique and
are likely shared by others frequenting this cafe. When com-
bined however, the set of users who lie at this intersection
is much smaller.
4.6 Fingerprint Granularity
Given a browsing session, we can either extract a single fin-
gerprint for the entire session (a cross site fingerprint) or
multiple fingerprints, one for each website in that session.
Most web browsing sessions consist of page visits to multi-
ple different websites. If we extract a cross site fingerprint,
then we extract a single fingerprint that describes the user’s
browsing behavior over all of these websites. If we extract
site fingerprints, then for each website in the session we ex-
tract a single fingerprint describing the user’s behavior on
that website in that session. Because these fingerprints are
being extracted on a per site basis, we extract multiple fin-
gerprints per session (one for each of the websites visited).
As each of these fingerprints reflect more localized behavior
(on a single website), they are less likely to be unique across
users. However, we can use the aggregation of fingerprints
across websites to identify users.
Though individual website based fingerprints are less in-
sightful, they are more resistant to user defenses. A cross
site fingerprint for example, may be hard to collect if the
user blocks third party cookies (preventing cross site data
from being collected by an adversary). However, the web-
site a user visits will always know the pages clicked on by
the user. If this website can extract a granular site specific
fingerprint for the user, they can use that to identify the
user when they revisit the website. Thus, even if a user uses
incognito mode to make these visits, the website may be still
be able to track them.
In this paper, we analyze both types of fingerprints. Our
Delicious dataset is an approximation of user browsing be-
havior from multiple sites, thereby allowing us to create a
cross-site fingerprint. In contrast, our MSNBC browsing
dataset is restricted to web browsing data on msnbc.com,
forcing us to develop a website specific fingerprint. As we
later demonstrate, we are able to launch a successful attack
using both types of fingerprints.
5. EMPIRICAL VALIDATION
In order to validate our attack strategies, we evaluated them
on real browsing data. Unfortunately, the lack of datasets of
real browsing sessions severely constrains our ability to test
different attack strategies. Before we present our strategies,
we briefly describe the two datasets we use in this paper.
5.1 MSNBC Browsing Dataset
We used the MSNBC Anonymous Browsing Data set ([3]).
The data contains a list of pages visited on msnbc.com for
990,000 users over a 24 hour period (on September 28, 1999).
For each user, we are given a list of the pages they visited.
However, pages are only represented at a ”category” level
(eg, ”homepage”, ”sports”, ”news”, etc).
5.2 Delicious Bookmark Data
We used a Delicious bookmark dataset to approximate user
browsing [4]. Delicious is a social bookmarking service,
which allows users to ”bookmark” web pages with descrip-
tive tags. The initial dataset contained 69226 pages from
1867 users. We were able to successfully scrape 40171 pages
from 1850 users. Restricting our attention to these pages,
we were able to to acquire a range of semantic signals (which
we discuss in depth later).
6. ATTACK STRATEGIES
We launch/evaluate our attacks in the following manner.
We begin by sampling n users, where each user has visited
a minimum of k pages. We randomly permute the order
of these k pages, and divide them into two sets. Each set
corresponds to a browsing session. Thus, for n users, we
will create a set of 2n browsing sessions. Given this set of
sessions, the goal of the attack is to identify which pairs of
sessions belong to the same user. We evaluate the success
of the attack using the metrics discussed above.
We now discuss the attack strategies we employed. We can
think of this as compromising of two primary tasks: finger-
print formulation and session similarity scoring. In finger-
print formulation, we seek to determine some way of repre-
senting each session’s content fingerprint. In session similar-
ity scoring, we seek to identify ways of determining if two
content fingerprints are sufficiently similar to have belonged
to the same user.
6.1 Fingerprint Representation
We now describe the features used in representing the fin-
gerprints for both sets of data.
6.1.1 MSNBC
Unfortunately, because of the restrictive nature of the MSNBC
dataset, we do not have much scope to explore fingerprint
representation. In the dataset, each page is represented as
a page category (a page can be ”news”, ”homepage”, ”local”,
”tech”, etc). The granularity of our data is restricted to the
page category, for a given page that a user visited, we only
know what category the page falls under. We have no other
information about that particular visit. Below is a sample
representation of the data:{1, 3, 5, 1, 3, 4, 4}{1, 3, 7}
{5, 7, 9, 14, 15}

Each line in the matrix above corresponds to the browsing
activity for a single user. For example, in this case the data
tells us that user corresponding to the second line visited a
page of category type 1, followed by category type 3, and
finally category type 7. This user visited no other pages on
msnbc.com during this time period.
These categories are the ”semantic signals” for each of the
user’s page visits. Despite the coarse grained information(very
different pages could be labelled with the same category), we
show it is still possible to construct unique fingerprints for
a subset of users and to correctly identify sessions originat-
ing from them. We represent each session as a vector of the
proportions of each of the 17 categories of pages visited in
each session. Thus if a session contained the visits to the
following pages:
[1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 4, 3, 3, 3]
The corresponding vector representation would be
[0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
Since visits to pages of category ”1” represent 10% of the
session’s page visits, pages of category ”2” represent 40%
of the session’s page visits, and etc. Each session can be
seen as a unit vector in a 17 dimensional space, where each
dimension corresponds to a category.
This representation is general and intuitive, but does fail to
capture some potentially interesting information such as the
order in which the user looks at pages in different categories.
6.1.2 Delicious
For the delicious data, we formulated several different ways
of representing session fingerprints.
1. TFIDF: We treat each session as a single ”document”
by collating all words across all pages in that session.
We represent each session as the vector of the TFIDF
scores of its words (using all sessions as the document
corpus). We ignore all words that appear in more than
95% of documents and we remove stop words. We use
a single layer autoencoder to reduce the dimensionality
of the resulting vector.
2. Domain: We represent each page by the domain name.
Thus, the content fingerprint of a browsing session is
represented as a single vector, where each dimension
corresponds to a different domain name and the value
at an index is the number of pages in the browsing
session that have the respective domain name.
3. Delicious Tag: We represent each page by the deli-
cious tags associated with it. Similar to above, the
content fingerprint is represented as a single vector
where each dimension corresponds to a tag, and the
value of the dimension is the number of pages which
have the tag.
We now discuss several different strategies for leveraging
these fingerprint representations to determine when two ses-
sions belong to the same user.
6.2 Weighted Closeness
If we can map sessions into a vector space based on their
content fingerprints, two sessions belonging to the same user
should be close to each other and far from sessions belonging
to other users. In measuring these relative distances, we can
determine if two sessions belong to the same user. In this
approach, we compute a score for every pair of sessions.
If the score for two sessions exceeds a threshold, then we
predict that two sessions originate from the same user.
For two sessions represented as the vectors si and sj , we
calculate Score(si, sj) in the following manner.
Score(si, sj) =
Cosine(si, sj)∑
k=0
1
Sim(si, sk)
+
∑
k=0
1
Sim(sj , sk)
where Cosine is cosine similarity. This score is the combi-
nation of a similarity score and a dissimilarity score. We
discuss both in more detail below.
6.2.1 Similarity Score
For calculating the similarity between two sessions si and sj ,
we use the cosine similarity metric, a common measure in
information retrieval. Given two vectors in an n-dimensional
space, cosine similarity measures their distance as a function
of the angle between them.
Cosine(si, sj) =
si · sj
||si||||sj ||
We expect that two sessions belong to the same user will
have approximately similar fingerprints, and thus a high co-
sine similarity score.
6.2.2 Dissimilarity Score
Simply measuring whether two sessions are similar is not
sufficient enough to capture whether or not they may origi-
nate from the same user. Our underlying goal is to be able
to capture and compare the content fingerprints of two ses-
sions. Thus, we need to weight the similarity of two sessions
by how dissimilar those sessions are from all other sessions.
If we have two sessions si and sj such that si is similar to sj
but both si and sj are similar to the bulk of the sessions in
our data set, we are less confidant that si and sj originate
from the same user. it is probable that si and sj (and the
sessions they are similar to) belong to a mass of users whose
behavior is too shallow or generic to discern. Conversely, if
si and sj were similar to each other but different from other
sessions, we would be significantly more confidant that both
sessions originated from the same user.
6.3 Supervised Learning
Alternatively, as opposed to devising our own similarity score,
we can rely on machine learning to learn some scoring func-
tion. We rely on a multi-layer perceptron classifier from
the scikit-learn python machine learning library[5]. For two
sessions si and sj with the feature vectors ci and cj , our
classifier takes as input the |ci − cj | (the absolute value of
the difference between the features).
6.4 Metrics
We now define the metrics used to evaluate the success of
an SIA strategy. We consider our attack in the following
framework. Assume we have a set of browsing sessions S =
{s1, s2, .., sn} where each si was launched by a single user
and there is at least one other sj ∈ S such that sj 6= si
and both sj and si were launched by the same user. For
every pair of sessions in S the goal for the adversary is to
identify whether they share the same user. We can measure
an adversary’s success along two dimensions.
6.4.1 Precision
Precision is defined as the proportion of session pairings
identified by the adversary that are correct. Let Sp be the
set of pairs of sessions such that for each pair the adversary
has predicted both sessions originate from the same user.
Let St be the set containing all pairs of sessions in S that
originate from the same user. We can then formally define:
Accuracy =
St ∩ Sp
Sp
6.4.2 Recall
We define recall as the proportion of same origin session
pairs successfully identified by the adversary. More formally:
Recall =
St ∩ Sp
St
6.4.3 Reach
We define reach as the number of unique users for whom
the advertiser has successfully paired at least two sessions.
Reach captures the ”user footprint” of the semantic identifi-
cation attack and allows us to quantify the number of users
(not sessions) that an adversary has successfully compro-
mised.
6.4.4 Success
It is important to note that in this framework, there are
many possible definitions for a ”successful” strategy. In the
ideal case, an adversary would prefer an attack strategy
which grantees high accuracy and high reach - identifying
sessions from a lot of users with high probability of correct-
ness. However depending on an adversary’s goals, different
dimensions may be prioritized. An advertiser for example,
seeking to broadly identify users in order to show related ad-
vertisements, may care less about accuracy and more about
reach. Since ads are generally viewed as terrible, they may
care more about maximizing the number of users they reach
(as opposed to the proportion of time they’re correct).
Conversely, a different adversary may care more about maxi-
mizing their accuracy (as opposed to their reach). If they’re
trying to closely track a set of users, they may care more
about the strength of their predictions and less about accu-
racy.
In the empirical evaluations conducted in this paper, we
choose to report to the precision and recall scores that cor-
respond to the maximum F1 score achieved for an attack
strategy. Since different adversaries have different priori-
ties, this metric conveys how well the ”average” adversary
would perform if employing the respective attack strategy.
7. DEFENSE MECHANISMS
[22] presents a cryptographic scheme in which fake packets of
information are interspersed with a sender’s message in or-
der to ensure security without requiring encryption. In this
scheme, the receiver uses an agreed upon message authenti-
cation code to discard the fake packets from the real pack-
ets of information. An adversary intercepting these pack-
ets however, will be unable to distinguish the genuine data
packets from the garbage ones, thus guaranteeing security.
We present a similar scheme to enable a user to defend
against a SIA. In this scheme, the user (via their browser)
inserts ”fake” page visits into their browsing session. For
example, the browser could make requests to different web
pages in the background of a user’s browsing. Though a
user wouldn’t see the content of the page, to any adver-
sary it would appear as if the user were visiting that page.
This would have the effect of obfuscating a user’s content
fingerprint, as the fake page visits would misrepresent their
profile. If an adversary cannot extract a meaningful content
fingerprint for a user, then it will be difficult to correlate a
user’s sessions. Unfortunately, making random page visits
is not sufficient, as an adversary might be able to normalize
out random noise from a user’s fingerprint. However, if a
user’s session’s content fingerprint is made to look more like
another user’s session’s content fingerprint, the adversary is
less likely to successfully fingerprint either user. Thus, a
user can defend themselves by adding page visits from other
users’ browsing sessions.
We implement this defense as follows. For a single session
si belonging to a user u, we select several other sessions be-
longing to different users. For each session, we select a pro-
portion of the pages and artificially add them to our original
session si. In effect, this makes si look more like these other
sessions. We repeat this procedure for all sessions.
8. RESULTS
We now outline the results achieved by applying these tech-
niques to the Delicious and MSNBC datasets. We begin by
describing salient characteristics of both datasets.
8.1 Data Characteristics
Most of the page visits in the MSNBC dataset are to ”news”,
”on-air” or ”sports” pages (table 1). In the Delicious dataset,
we see that most of the tags are technology related and that
most of the commonly visited sites are news.
8.2 Session Creation
The MSNBC data consists of the page views (labeled by
page category) from a user over the course of 24 hours. How-
ever, for a single user it collates all visits over the 24 hours,
and doesn’t distinguish between different sessions launched
by that user. For a given page visit, we cannot determine
when the user visited the page, or what other pages the user
Page Category Frequency Proportion
front page 940469 0.200
news 452387 0.096
tech 207479 0.044
local 386217 0.082
opinion 151409 0.032
on-air 414928 0.088
misc 305615 0.065
weather 439398 0.093
health 196614 0.041
living 131760 0.028
business 96817 0.020
sports 264899 0.056
summary 216125 0.045
bulletin board service 395880 0.084
travel 56576 0.012
msn-news 25249 0.005
msn-sports 16972 0.003
Table 1: Distribution of page views over page cate-
gories
Top Tags Top Domains
design www.youtube.com
tools www.guardian.co.uk
education en.wikipedia.org
web mashable.com
web20 www.nytimes.com
video www.slideshare.net
blog github.com
webdesign lifehacker.com
viapackratius d.hatena.ne.jp
inspiration www.bbc.co.uk
Table 2: Most popular domains and tags for Deli-
cious data
also visited in that session. Thus, we have to simulate sepa-
rating the page visits into different sessions. We do this by
randomly splitting each user’s visited pages into two sets,
and treat each set as a separate browsing session. This also
allows our browsing sessions to conform to the consistency
assumption described in section 4.1.
Similarly, the Delicious dataset consists of various web pages
tagged by users with bookmarks. Since this is an approxima-
tion of the browsing of each user (a user is unlikely to tag all
the web pages they visit), it doesn’t represent actual session
based browsing activity. Like with the MSNBC dataset, we
have to artificially create browsing sessions. Again, we do
this by randomly splitting the pages tagged by a user into
two sets, treating each as a distinct browsing session.
8.3 Attack Performance
8.3.1 Metric Methodology
As discussed previously, different attackers may employ dif-
ferent definitions of ”success”, based on whether they prefer
a strategy that maximizes precision or recall. In evaluating
different attack strategies, we report the precision and recall
at the point at which the F1 score for the attack is maxi-
mized. This allows us to quantify how well the approach
would work for the ”average” adversary. In addition, we re-
port the ”reach” for each attack. This is the number of users
successfully identified.
When evaluating an attack strategy, we simulate the attack
multiple times. In every trial, we sample a new set of users
from our data. Since the success of a SIA attack is a function
of the distinguishability of the users, simulating multiple tri-
als allows us to evaluate the range of attack performances.
Since this is a privacy problem, we are primarily concerned
with the worst case scenario. We therefore report the results
of the worst case iteration. This is the trial where the ad-
versary performs the best (the iteration with the highest F1
score). However, data regarding the average performance of
each attack strategy across all iterations can be found in the
appendix.
8.3.2 Baseline
The baseline approach is equivalent to an adversary ran-
domly guessing pairs of sessions to correspond to the same
user. We simulate this by assigning a random score between
0 and 1 for every pair of sessions. We designate all session
pairs whose score exceeds a cutoff to belong to the same
user. We report the precision and recall of this approach at
the cutoff that maximizes the F1 score.
8.3.3 Attack Strategy Performances
Table 3 and Table 4 contains the results of baseline, weighted
closeness, and supervised learning attack strategies on the
Delicious and MSNBC datasets respectively. For the weighted
closeness strategy, we sampled 20 users with at least 40 page
visits (at least 20 pages per session), and calculated the
weighted closeness scores between all pairs of sessions. We
then selected a cutoff that maximized the F1 score for the
attack. We repeated this process 20 times for each attack,
and report the results from the worst case results (when the
adversary performs the best) in Table 3 and Table 4. Table
7 and Table 8 in the Appendix contains the averaged per-
formance over all 20 trials. On the Delicious data, we ran
the weighted closeness strategy on page tag, domain, and
page text fingerprint representations. On the MSNBC data,
we ran the weighted closeness strategy on the page label
fingerprint representation.
For the supervised learning approach, we trained a neural
network with a single hidden layer with 100 neurons on all
session pairs from a sample of 20 users (where each user had
40 page visits). We then tested the network on all pairs of
sessions from another sample of 20 users. We treated the
predicted class probability for each pair of sessions as the
similarity score between both sessions. We then selected a
cutoff that maximized the F1 score for the attack.
On the Delicious dataset, every approach except for the neu-
ral network (when applied to tags and domains) exceeded
the baseline F1 score. Weighted closeness applied to page
tags was the most successful strategy, correctly identifying
sessions for 9 users (out of 20) with a precision of 0.82 and
a recall of 0.45. In general, we see that weighted closeness
outperformed the neural network.
On the MSNBC data, both the neural network and the
weighted closeness approach exceeded the baseline F1 score.
Like the Delicious data, the weighted closeness approach was
the most successful, correctly identifying 14 users at a pre-
cision of 0.35 and a recall of 0.7. In comparing the results
of the MSNBC data to the Delicious data, we can see that
the weighted closeness was a more effective attack on the
Delicious dataset. We can attribute this to the granularity
of the Delicious page tags, which were far more descriptive
than the MSNBC tags. The success of both approaches on
the MSNBC data - in spite of the broadness of the MSNBC
page labels - is indicative of the strength of both attacks.
We also investigated the effects of the user sample size on
the performances of these attacks. Instead of running the
attack on a fixed sample of 20 users, we experimented on
different numbers of users. Table 17,18,16, and 15 (found in
the Appendix A) contain the results for different user sample
sizes on the MSNBC and Delicious data respectively. For
each sample size, we ran 20 iterations of a weighted closeness
attack (using page tags for Delicious data and the page labels
for MSNBC data) and reported the results from the worst
case trial and the average across all trials. As we can see, the
performance of the attacks steadily decrease as the number
of users increases. This result is expected as identifying
sessions becomes harder when the number of users increases
and users become harder to distinguish. However, we can
see that even with a 45 user sample, we are able to identify
19 users with an overall precision of 0.5 and a recall of 0.47.
We also investigated the effect of session length. Table 11,12,
13 , and 14 (both found in the Appendix) contain the results
for different minimum session lengths on the MSNBC and
Delicious data respectively. For each sample size, we ran
20 iterations of a weighted closeness attack (using page tags
for Delicious data and the page labels for MSNBC data)
and reported the results from the worst case trial and the
average across all trials. As we can see, the performance of
the attacks steadily increases as the minimum session length
increases. This result is expected as the content fingerprint
for sessions become more representative of the user browsing
profile as the session grows in length.
8.4 Defense Performance
We also evaluated the strength of our defensive mechanisms.
We validated these countermeasures by running them on a
set of user sessions and launching a weighted closeness at-
tack on the sessions. We sampled 20 users with at least 40
page visits (at least 20 pages per session), and implemented
the obfuscation mechanisms. We then launched a weighted
closeness attack (using the page tags as features for the de-
licious data). We repeated this process 20 times. In Table 5
and Table 6 we can see the results of the defenses. ”Session
sample size” is the number of other sessions we randomly
sampled and ”Page sample size” is the number of pages we
sampled from each of these sessions to add to the user’s
browsing. As we can see, the defense worked best for both
Delicious and MSNBC when we sampled 10 pages from a
single random session. For the average results of these tri-
als, see Table 9 and Table 8 in the Appendix.
9. DISCUSSION
Our work demonstrates the feasibility of a semantic identifi-
cation attack and the threat it poses to privacy. The attack
strategies we present were demonstrated to be effective, ca-
pable of identifying, for a significant fraction of users, when
Method F1 Precision Recall Reach
Weighted closeness on Domain 0.5 0.67 0.4 8
Weighted closeness on Tag 0.58 0.82 0.45 9
Weighted closeness on Text 0.41 0.42 0.4 8
Neural Net on Tags 0.08 0.33 0.05 1
Neural Net on Domain 0.06 0.05 0.1 2
Neural Net on Words 0.17 0.15 0.2 4
Baseline 0.13 0.13 ,0.15 ,3
Table 3: Performance of various attacks for the Delicious dataset
Method F1 Precision Recall Reach
Weighted closeness 0.47 0.35 0.7 14
Neural 0.25 0.33 0.2 2
Baseline 0.13 0.2 0.1 2
Table 4: Performance of different type of attacks on the MSNBC Dataset
two sessions belong to the same user. We show that even
with coarse signals - such as those present in the MSNBC
data - we are capable of correctly associating a significant
fraction of users’ sessions.
On the Delicious dataset, nearly all methods exceeded the
baseline approach. Computing weighted closeness distance
scores on web page tags was the most effective attack, per-
forming better on average (and in the worst case) than all
other methods. The success of all three types of features
offer insight into user behavior. The success of the domains
feature implies that users tend to return to the same do-
mains, but differ from each other in the domains they visit.
The success of the page tags supports the intuition behind
the SIA - that user browsing is topically consistent and mo-
tivated by a fixed set of interests. Finally, the success of
the page text feature demonstrates that users are relatively
consistent in the content they consume.
In general, the weighted closeness distance proved to be more
effective at identifying users than the neural net approach.
Amongst the features, the weighted closeness approach was
most successful when using page tags. The relative success of
page tags (over page content and page domains) highlights
the importance of granularity for semantic signals. If the
signals are too coarse, then the generated fingerprint will
not be specific enough and sessions from different users will
have too similar fingerprints. In contrast, if the semantic
signal is too specific, the fingerprints for each session will
be too different. In this case, we will likely predict sessions
from the same user as originating from different users. In
the case of the Delicious dataset, we see that tag features
present an optimal level of granularity between the page
domains and page text. However, we could also interpret
this to mean that our text model was unable to successfully
capture the core topics of each page. This is something we
hope to investigate in future work.
On the MSNBC dataset, the weighted closeness distance
metric also performs the best. However, it’s performance
is significantly worse than the performance of the weighted
closeness distance method on the Delicious dataset. This is
likely because the Delicious tags are far richer and convey
more semantic information than the MSNBC page labels.
Intuitively, it makes sense that the performance of an attack
would decrease as the sample of users increases in size. We
expect a majority of users to be relatively indistinguishable.
As our sample increases in size, the number of indistinguish-
able users will grow disproportionately, resulting in the at-
tack misclassifying a greater number of session pairs. In
both the MSNBC and Delicious datasets, we see that as the
number of users in the sample increases, the performance of
the algorithm reduces significantly. As we discussed previ-
ously, this result is expected. The problem of distinguishing
users is highly dependent on the number of users. As the
sample size increases, users become harder to distinguish.
The defense mechanism we formulated represents an im-
provement in privacy for users. On both the Delicious and
MSNBC datasets, the defensive measures were successful in
lowering the F1 score for the attack.
The range of potential semantic signals extends far beyond
those referenced (or used) in this paper. For example, they
could use third party cookies to gather the pages visited
by a user across multiple sites [15]. Alternatively, a first
party website could log every action by a user on its website
and use these to construct site specific content fingerprints.
In either case, the adversary would have access to a set of
semantic signals significantly richer than those present in
our data. In the best case for users, the adversary would
merely replicated our performance. In the worst case, they
might fare significantly better and identify more users.
In summary, the results of our experiments demonstrate
that an adversary employing our attacks could successfully
extract content fingerprints from a subset of sessions and
use those fingerprints to identify when two sessions were
launched by the same user. We presented a framework for
evaluating the success of these attacks in the context of
an adversary’s goals and demonstrate how different attacks
could be advantageous to different adversaries.
It is important to recognize that semantic identification at-
tacks are applicable to a vastly greater range of contexts
than those presented in this paper. The New York Times
for example, may run a semantic identification attack on
each of its registered accounts to see if multiple individuals
are using the same account. A shopping website may launch
Session sample size Page sample size F1 Precision Recall Reach
1 5 0.49 0.48 0.5 10
1 10 0.32 0.45 0.25 5
2 5 0.5 0.56 0.45 9
Table 5: Performance of various defensive measures on the Delicious dataset (worst case trial)
Session Sample Size Page Sample Size F1 Precision Recall Reach
2 5 0.41 0.32 0.55 11
1 5 0.48 0.77 0.35 7.0
1 10 0.32 0.45 0.25 5
Table 6: Performance of various defenses on MSNBC dataset (worst case trial)
an attack to identify users based on their interests or habits.
Going beyond web browsing, they can be generalized to any
kind of behavior pattern. They allow an adversary to launch
an identification attack on an individual’s habits and rou-
tines, from driving routes to purchasing habits. As these
are significantly harder to disguise than metadata, semantic
identification attacks can be incredibly powerful.
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APPENDIX
Table 7: Results of various attacks for the Delicious dataset (averaged across all trials)
Method F1 Precision Recall Reach
Weighted Closeness
(domains)
0.35 0.46 0.32 6.5
Weighted Closeness
(tags)
0.48 0.56 0.48 9.6
Weighted Closeness
(text)
0.25 0.3 0.27 5.3
Neural Net (tags) 0.052 0.041 0.95 19.05
Neural Net (domains) 0.054 0.03 0.75 15
Neural Net (words) 0.16 0.18 0.19 3.8
Baseline 0.073 0.054 0.47 9.45
Table 8: Performance of different type of attacks on the MSNBC Dataset (averaged across all trials)
Method Average F1 Average Precision Average Recall Average Reach
Weighted closeness
(labels)
0.29 0.60 0.31 6.35
Neural (labels) 0.11 0.13 0.74 7.4
Baseline 0.08 0.07 0.25 4.9
Table 9: Results of various defensive measures on the Delicious dataset (averaged across all trials)
Session sample
size
Page sample size F1 Precision Recall Reach
1 5 0.27 0.30 0.34 6.75
1 10 0.17 0.19 0.24 4.8
2 5 0.21 0.23 0.27 5.4
Table 10: Results of various defenses on MSNBC dataset (averaged across all trials)
Session sample
size
Pages Sample
Size
F1 Precision Recall Reach
2 5 0.25 0.22 0.39 7.75
1 5 0.30 ,0.33 0.42 8.55
1 10 0.21 0.22 0.28 5.65
Table 11: Results of different minimum session lengths on MSNBC dataset (worst case trial)
Minimum Session
Length
F1 Precision Recall Reach
5 0.52 1 0.35 7
10 0.48 0.78 0.35 7
15 0.52 0.5 0.55 11
20 0.47 0.36 0.7 14
25 0.59 0.65 0.55 11
30 0.58 0.5 0.7 14
35 0.55 0.52 0.6 12
40 0.73 0.92 0.6 12
Table 12: Results of different minimum session lengths on MSNBC dataset (averaged across all trials)
Minimum Session
Length
F1 Precision Recall Reach
5 0.3 0.53 0.3 5.9
10 0.28 0.56 0.22 4.4
15 0.33 0.56 0.34 6.85
20 0.29 0.60 0.32 6.35
25 0.31 0.53 0.35 7.05
30 0.34 0.46 0.44 8.85
35 0.32 0.46 0.48 9.65
40 0.35 0.59 0.41 8.15
Table 13: Effect of minimum session lengths on Delicious dataset (worst case trials)
Minimum Session
Length
F1 Precision Recall Reach
5 0.67 0.85 0.55 11
10 0.67 0.85 0.55 11
15 0.71 0.86 0.6 12
20 0.76 0.82 0.7 14
25 0.72 0.6 0.9 18
Table 14: Results of different minimum session lengths on Delicious dataset (averaged across all trials)
Minimum Session
Length
F1 Precision Recall Reach
5 0.48 0.58 0.44 8.75
10 0.50 0.54 0.515 10.3
15 0.51 0.55 0.50 9.9
20 0.51 0.57 0.53 10.55
25 0.49 0.59 0.51 10.25
Table 15: Results of different user sample sizes on Delicious dataset (worst case trials)
Number of Users F1 Precision Recall Reach
5 1 1 1 5
10 0.76 0.72 0.8 8
15 0.65 0.52 0.86 13
20 0.70 0.85 0.6 12
25 0.61 0.62 0.6 15
30 0.64 0.73 0.56 17
35 0.47 0.47 0.48 17
40 0.48 0.5 0.47 19
Table 16: Results of different user sample sizes on Delicious dataset (averaged across all trials)
Number of Users F1 Precision Recall Reach
5 0.75 0.79 0.78 3.9
10 0.57 0.65 0.56 5.6
15 0.52 0.63 0.5 7.5
20 0.46 0.52 0.47 9.55
25 0.43 0.49 0.44 11.2
30 0.42 0.46 0.42 12.75
35 0.35 0.39 0.36 12.75
40 0.35 0.38 0.36 14.45
Table 17: Results of different user sample sizes on MSNBC dataset (worst case trials)
User Sample Size F1 Precision Recall Reach
5 1 1 1 5
10 0.77 0.625 1 10
15 0.61 0.52 0.73 11
20 0.58 0.61 0.55 11
25 0.45 0.43 0.48 12
30 0.42 0.69 0.3 9
35 0.52 0.48 0.57 20
40 0.37 0.35 0.4 16
Table 18: Results of different user sample sizes on MSNBC dataset (averaged across all trials)
User Sample Size F1 Precision Recall Reach
5 0.60 0.70 0.69
10 0.46 0.54 0.60 5.95
15 0.34 0.57 0.38 5.75
20 0.35 0.65 0.35 7.05
25 0.25 0.56 0.25 6.3
30 0.21 0.49 0.32 9.45
35 0.25 0.52 0.21 7.4
40 0.19 0.54 0.25 9.85
